Agency Conflicts, Financial Distress, and Syndicate Structure: Evidence from Japanese Borrowers by Lee, Sang Whi et al.
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
Agency Conflicts, Financial Distress, and Syndicate
Structure: Evidence from Japanese Borrowers
Author(s)
Lee, Sang Whi; Kwag, Seung-Woog (Austin);






RightCenter for Economic Institutions 





  CEI Working Paper Series, No. 2006-11 
   
"Agency Conflicts, Financial Distress, and 
Syndicate Structure: Evidence from 
Japanese Borrowers" 
 
Sang Whi Lee 
Seung-Woog Kwang 


















Center for Economic 
Institutions 
 
Working Paper Series 
 
Institute of Economic Research 
Hitotsubashi University 
2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8603    JAPAN 
Tel:  +81-42-580-8405 
Fax:  +81-42-580-8333 





Agency Conflicts, Financial Distress, and Syndicate Structure: 





Sang Whi Lee 
School of International Trades and Business 
Kyung Hee University 
Seoul 130-701, Korea  
Tel: (+) 82-2-961-9181  
E-Mail: slee@khu.ac.kr  
 
Seung-Woog (Austin) Kwag 
Utah State University 
Logan, UT 84322-3510 
Tel : (435) 797-2361 
E-Mail : akwag@b202.usu.edu 
 
Donald J. Mullineaux 
Gatton College of Business and Economics 
University of Kentucky 
Lexington, KY 40506-0034 




Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology 
Seoul 130-722, Korea 












     
 Agency Conflicts, Financial Distress, and Syndicate Structure: 










  We examine how borrower firm characteristics affect the size structure in the Japanese syndicated  
loan market for the 1999-2003 period. Consistent with the view by Lee and Mullineaux (2004), we find 
that syndicates are smaller when borrowers have higher credit risk, while firms with greater information 
asymmetry are associated with larger syndicates in Japan.  These results are primarily driven by non-
keiretsu (non-business group) firms. This suggests that the role of enhanced monitoring and facilitated 
renegotiation is especially useful for banks participating in Japanese syndicated loan for non-keiretsu 
firms. On the other hand, information problems seem to be less severe for keiretsu (business group) firms 
which tend to have easier access to syndicated loan via the intermediation of in-house banks in the 
relevant syndicate. Finally, we find that keiretsu (non-keiretsu) firms have less (more) fraction of loan by 
their agent banks as the maturity rises. It appears that main banks of keiretsu firms with informational 
advantage are likely to retain less of the loan and form a more dispersed syndicate to "signal' that the loan 
is of high quality with increased maturity. This further confirms the view that information problems are 













     
I. Introduction 
Japan's syndicated loan market is still small for the size of its economy, since the vast majority of 
loan transactions in Japan are still bilateral transactions that are provided by individual banks under 
separate agreements.  According to the recent sources from Thomson Financial and the Bank of Japan, 
syndicated loans account for just 5% of overall Japanese lending, compared with 30% to 35% in the U. S. 
Nevertheless, the syndicated loan market is rapidly developing due to several fundamental factors: In the 
last few years, in an effort to use their capital efficiently, Japanese banks have become more focused on 
risk-adjusted returns.  Large acquisition financing is increasing in Japan, which requires banks to spread 
the risk among members of a syndicate.  Japanese borrowers are discovering with syndicated loans the 
benefits of having access to a lending universe larger than the few relationship banks from which they 
have received bilateral transactions. 
The value of syndicated loans in Japan increased 58% in the two years ended in March 2004, to 
19 trillion yen ($174.63 billion). Japan's market for syndicated loans which was nonexistent eight years 
ago is growing given the fact that overall lending by Japanese banks has fallen for 78 months in a row.  
Bankers and analysts predict that syndicated loans will play an even bigger role in corporate finance in 
Japan in the future.
1      Syndicated loans represent a hybrid of traditional bank loans and capital market 
instruments, or in the language of Boot and Thakor (2000), a mix of “relationship loans” and 
“transactions loans.” Syndicating loans involves a process similar to underwriting and, on occasion, loans 
are formally underwritten. In addition, by the end of the 1990s, a large percentage of individual 
syndicated loans was rated by Moody’s and/or Standard and Poor’s.  Nonetheless, the evidence provided 
by Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and Jones, Lang, and Nigro (2000) indicates there is a significant 
“relationship” aspect to syndicated lending.  
Finance theory suggests that firms with relatively few information problems and agency problems 
are more likely to have access to capital markets.  We extend this logic to examine the marketability of 
loans to certain numbers of banks that choose to participate in a financing.  While syndicate size 






     
factors play a role in syndicate formation.  The structure of syndicates involves issues addressed in 
organization theory since syndicating a loan amounts to outsourcing the financing component of a loan 
transaction.
2  The size of a syndicate will be especially relevant in the event the borrower becomes 
financially distressed, since all members of the group must approve any significant changes to the terms 
of a loan.   
In this paper, we examine how borrower firm characteristics affect the size structure of 
syndications using Japanese syndicated loan market data for the 1999-2003 period.  Consistent with the 
view of small syndicates’ enhanced monitoring and renegotiation hypothesis by Lee and Mullineaux 
(2004) that we find that syndicates are smaller when Japanese borrowers have higher credit risk, and 
firms with greater information asymmetry are associated with smaller syndicates.  These results are 
primarily driven by non-keiretsu (non-business group) firms. This suggests that the role of enhanced 
monitoring and facilitated renegotiation is especially useful for banks participating in Japanese syndicated 
loan for non-keiretsu firms.  
On the other hand, information problems seem to be less severe for keiretsu firms which tend to 
have easier access to syndicated loan via the intermediation of in-house banks in the syndicate. This is 
consistent with the view by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Sharfstein (1990) who argue that financial ties between 
main banks and their client firms reduce information asymmetry and incentive problems, allow financial 
flexibility for firms, so that firms may continue to proceed with ongoing projects. Finally, we find that the 
maturity of syndicated loans is an important factor in determining the loan share of lead agent bank in a 
syndicate.  Keiretsu firms have less fraction of loan by the agent bank as the maturity rises, while non-
keiretsu firms have greater fraction of loan by the agent bank as the maturity rises. It appears that main 
banks of keiretsu firms with informational advantage are likely to retain less of the loan and form a more 
dispersed syndicate to "signal' that the loan is of high quality for as the maturity rises. This further 
confirms the view that information problems are less severe in the keiretsu firms.  
While previous study (i.e., Lee and Mullineaux (2004)) have examined already the syndicate 






     
biggest loan markets in Asia, Japan. We specify and estimate models that relate the size of loan 
syndicates originated in Japan to various proxies not only for adverse selection, moral hazard, and hold-
out problems, but also for the relevance of proprietary information, which was not tested in any previous 
study. This paper provides further empirical supports for the hypotheses that the marketability of debt 
claims are associated with information and agency factors, and contributes to previous research by 
locating the common factors that affect the syndicate structure regardless of the place of loan origination.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a brief overview of the 
loan syndication market.  Section III provides a more detailed overview of previous studies on loan 
syndication and Section IV discusses what kind of factors might influence syndicate size in Japan.   
Section V presents the empirical results and Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Overview of Syndicated Lending  
A syndicate consists of a group of financial institutions that provides financing to a single 
borrower.   In a syndicated loan, two or more lenders extend a loan to the borrower.   The loan is 
administered by a common agent bank and governed by a common document (or set of documents) 
among the lenders.  Each bank acts without responsibility for the other banks in the syndicate with respect 
to its relationship with the borrower.  If one of the syndicate members fails to meet its obligations to the 
borrower, the other syndicate members have no legal responsibilities to provide those funds to the 
borrower.   
Even though syndicate members are referred to by different titles, such as agent, manager, or co-
manager, each lender holds a common loan agreement with the borrower and receives a note that shows 
the lender's share in the syndicate.  Consequently, there exists a direct relationship between the borrower 
and each lender in the syndicate.  Given this direct relationship, syndicated loans may have advantages 
over other types of financing.  Typically, however, the agent bank plays a more active role in analyzing 
the borrower’s credit worthiness and in monitoring its financial and operating activities.  Consequently, 






     
Before marketing the syndication, the agent prepares an information memorandum on behalf of the 
borrower.  Potential participants are required to sign a confidentiality agreement before they receive the 
memorandum in order to prevent sensitive information from being disseminated in the market.   In 
addition to the information memorandum, both the borrower and the agent need to confirm final decisions 
on the term sheet.   
Once invitations are prepared, the borrower and/or agent select banks that will receive 
invitations.  The borrower can indicate the number of banks preferred in Syndication Strategy  (the sub-
section of a term sheet), especially when the borrower wants the transaction to be a relationship-driven 
transaction.  For example, the borrower may want to choose exclusively from its existing relationship 
banks to reduce uncertainty about performance.  Alternatively, the borrower may want to enter a new 
business, so it might choose banks having expertise in that area.  
After the final members are determined, the agent bank distributes the documentation and 
announces the loan terms with all the participating banks.  During this process, it is common to find that 
the total amount committed by the participating lenders is greater (over-subscription) or less (under-
subscription) than the amount required by the borrower.  When over-subscription occurs, the commitment 
amount is usually 20-100% higher than the amount required by the borrower, which indicates the 
syndication has clearly been a success.  There can be many possible reasons for over-subscription. The 
deal may be very attractively priced such that it attracts more banks than expected.  Alternatively, some 
good information about the borrower might be released during the syndication.  
In the event of over-subscription, it is the borrower who decides whether to accept the increase or 
not.   The agent has no right to increase the amount of the commitment without the borrower’s 
permission.  In the case of under-subscription, if the agent agrees to fully underwrite the total facility, the 
agent(s) is required to take up the shortage so that the borrower can obtain the commitment it 
requested.  Once allocations and commitments are finally completed, all the relevant parties sign the loan 







     
III. Related Literature  
In their paper, Lee and Mullineaux (2004) study the factors that influence the size and 
composition of commercial lending syndicates in the U.S.  They find that syndicates are smaller and more 
concentrated, as reflected in the Hirschman Herfindahl Index for the lending group, when there is less 
information available about the borrower, when credit risk is relatively high, and when a loan is secured.  
They also find that syndicates are larger and more diffuse when the arranging bank is more reputable, 
when the arranger constrains the loan re-sale activity of group members, when the loan has a long term to 
maturity, and when the borrower holds large growth options. In a recent paper, Sufi (2006) empirically 
examines the US syndicated loan market, with an emphasis on how information asymmetry between 
lenders and borrowers. He finds that the lead bank retains a larger share of the loan and forms a more 
concentrated syndicate when the borrower requires more intense monitoring and due diligence. When 
information asymmetry between the borrower and lenders is potentially severe, participant lenders are 
closer to the borrower, both geographically and in terms of previous lending relationships. Sufi (2006) 
concludes that lead bank and borrower reputation mitigates, but does not eliminate, information 
asymmetry problems. 
Factors determining when a loan will be financed by multiple lenders rather than a single creditor 
are examined in Dennis and Mullineaux (2000).  They find that loans are more likely to be syndicated as 
information about the borrower becomes more transparent.  This result is consistent with the so-called 
life-cycle model of borrowing associated with Diamond (1991) and Carey, Prowse, Rea, and Udell (1993).  
The essential idea is that borrowers will gravitate from private sources of funds (such as venture capital, 
commercial banks and commercial finance companies) to public debt markets as firms grow larger, 
disseminate increased information, and develop a reputation by continuously repaying their debt 
obligations.  Syndicated loans represent a hybrid of private and public debt, and the results of Dennis and 
Mullineaux (2000) suggest that a loan becomes more marketable to investors as adverse selection 
problems become less severe.  Their study also finds that certain characteristics of a loan influence its 






     
Given that an originating bank has decided to syndicate a loan, a larger portion can be sold to syndicate 
participants if the loan is unsecured.  A significant literature (Gorton and Pennachi (1995) and Pichler and 
Wilhelm (2001) are examples) argues that the reputation of the seller can serve to mitigate agency 
problems in a loan sale or syndication context.  Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) confirm this view, finding 
that a loan is more likely to be syndicated when the originating institution is more reputable as reflected 
in a history of repeat transactions with particular participants in a syndicate.  Their results also indicate 
that reputable arrangers sell off larger portions of the loans they syndicate. 
  Jones, Lang and Nigro (2000) study the share of a syndicated loan held by the arranger, using 
Shared National Credit Program data over the period 1995-99.  They emphasize that the ability to 
overcome adverse selection and moral hazard problems has been critical for the development of this 
market.  Like Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), the authors find that lead banks retain larger portions of the 
lower-quality loans they originate.  They also observe that a segment of arrangers tends to specialize in 
lower-quality credits and that these banks market a larger share of their low-quality loans in syndication.  
Their study is a useful complement to Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) since it uses a different and 
substantially larger database.  They are also able to use observed bank examiner loan ratings as a measure 
of credit risk. 
  A syndicate can be viewed as a team or strategic alliance formed for the purpose of providing 
finance to a particular borrower.  As Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) note, a syndicate is a unique type of 
team since it is formed to carry out a well-defined function and is, by nature, a temporary alliance.  A 
syndicate disbands when a loan is repaid.  A large literature emphasizes the relevance of agency costs in a 
team production setting, but these problems are likely to be even more severe when the team’s existence 
is ephemeral.  Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) provide a formal analysis of how a syndicate’s organizational 
structure can arise as a contractual response to the relationship-intensive nature of finance.  While the 
focus of their model is the formation of investment-bank underwriting syndicates, the logic holds in the 
case of commercial lending syndicates as well.  In fact, the lead arranger in a lending syndicate typically 






     
underwriters do not.  “Relationship” consequently is potentially even more relevant to lending syndicates 
than to underwriting groups.  Since commercial loans are increasingly re-sold in the capital markets by 
the original participants in a lending syndicate, the distinction between loan syndication and bond 
underwriting has been somewhat eroded in the market, however. 
  When participating in a loan syndicate, the members of the group clearly delegate at least some 
monitoring in the sense of Diamond (1984) to the lead arranger and other designated agents.  A team 
production process invites agency problems involving both adverse selection and moral hazard.  Pichler 
and Wilhelm (2001) investigate the moral hazard issue from a theoretical perspective and demonstrate 
how the designation of a particular group member as a “lead banker” essentially acts as a monitoring 
device that threatens those who might shirk with a loss of reputation and the quasi-rents associated with 
that intangible asset.  A key aspect of their model is that the syndicate for a particular deal is formed after 
effort is exerted.  While they focus on investment banking syndicates, this condition also holds in 
commercial lending syndicates since the terms of the deal are negotiated prior to the loan’s distribution to 
the participants.  There is a noteworthy distinction, however, between investment and commercial 
banking syndicates.  The lead investment bank distributes securities to syndicate participants for the 
purpose of re-sale to capital market investors.  The lead commercial bank arranger distributes portions of 
the loan to participants that may or may not re-sell the loan to other investors.  In fact, the lead arranger 
and/or borrower can limit subsequent sales of loans purchased in a syndication context.  We investigate 
below whether such limits influence the structure of a commercial lending syndicate. 
  The basic intuition of the Pichler-Wilhelm model is that the issuer/borrower gains when an 
institution is designated as a lead and the lead institution’s ability to control the make-up of the syndicate 
mitigates moral hazard problems within the team.  The lead bank’s own concern with the loss of quasi-
rents provides strong motivation not to erode the value of its reputation. 
IV. Testable Hypotheses 
The syndicate size is the number of banks participating in the syndicate.  If a loan is syndicated, 






     
practice, syndicates involving more than 30 banks are rare.  The parties associated with a lending 
syndicate are a borrower, one or more agent banks, and a set of participant banks.  All the parties may 
have concerns about the size of a syndicate.  As a basic economic principle, syndicates should increase in 
size as the overall benefits of expanding the size of a lending group exceed the relevant marginal costs.   
The arranger of a lending syndicate should prefer a small to a large group, since the costs of 
managing a syndicate increase with the number of participants.  While the lead bank (and any designated 
agents) presumably has some concern with administrative expenses, a major potential cost associated 
with a large lending group involves the expense of restructuring the loan in the event of financial distress.  
Since the members of the syndicate must unanimously agree to any substantive changes in the loan 
contract, negotiation costs and the prospect of hold-out problems increase directly with syndicate size.  
Sizeable syndicates would be especially problematic when credit risk is high.
3  
The arranging bank can influence the size of the syndicate in several ways.  First, it decides on 
the number of institutions it will invite to participate.  Rhodes (1996) estimates that, as a rough average, 
about a third of the invited banks will participate in a syndicate.  Second, it chooses the initial menu of 
designated amounts for participation, the dollar size of each bracket, and the fees to be paid for 
participation in each bracket.  Given the loan amount, syndicate size will increase if the lead bank offers 
relatively small bracket amounts.
4  Third, the lead bank reserves the right to close the syndication at any 
time prior to the designated end of the offering period.  Fourth, the lead bank can adjust the portion of the 
loan it chooses to take.
5  The arranger cannot precisely control the size of the syndicate, however, because 
it cannot be certain of participant demands for the relative amounts offered.  If total demand for the loan 
exceeds the size of the loan (and the borrower chooses not to increase the loan amount), the lead bank will 
allocate the loan, with implications for the size in the syndicate.  If the loan is oversubscribed, syndicate 
size will increase.
6
  We specify and estimate models that relate the size of loan syndicates originated in Japan to 






     
whether comprehensive loan characteristics and contractual restrictions on the re-sale behavior of the 
syndicate participants influence syndicate size, however, because the necessary data are not available. 
  The models we estimate take the following general form: 
Syndicate Size = f (Agency Conflicts, Financial Distress, Proprietary Information, Profitability, Loan        
Characteristics, Control Variables) 
The definitions of the variables used in our estimations are in Table 1.  
1.  Agency Conflicts 
1) Information Problems   
Since the market typically possesses more information about larger firms, larger size borrowers 
are less likely to be information problematic.  Also, these firms generally have had more time to build a 
“reputation” in the form of a history of debt repayments or to establish relationships with financial 
institutions, so the prospect for these firms to appeal to a large set of lenders is relatively high.  Lenders in 
a syndicate will be concerned about the availability and quality of information regarding the borrower and 
will prefer “transparent” borrowers to “opaque” ones, other things equal.  Consequently, more lenders are 
likely to participate in a syndicate when borrower information is “transparent.”   
On the other hand, information problematic firms require more monitoring, so lead banks should 
offer invitees relatively larger portions of such loans to enhance incentives to monitor.  While the agent 
undertakes some delegated monitoring on behalf of the participants, bank regulations require that each 
lender perform due diligence independently. Based on this argument, we hypothesize that a firm’s size is 
negatively related to the size of syndicate.  We use two proxies for the scale and the scope of information 
problems.  LNSALES is the natural logarithm of annual sales in the year of the syndication.  LNASSETS 
is the natural logarithm of book value of assets in the year of syndication. 
The signs of these coefficients are ambiguous and results from Lee and Mullinaux (2004) show 
mixed signs on these variables. Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and Jones, Lang and Nigro (2000) found 







     
2) Agency Problems Between the Borrower and Lenders    
Agency costs can influence syndicate size.  Studies such as Barclay and Smith (1995a and 
1995b), Houston and James (1996), and Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999) argue that firms 
with high leverage and growth options are more likely to rely on private debt as moral hazard problems 
become more severe.  To measure the agency costs between the borrower and the lenders, we employ the 
borrower’s fixed assets to its book value of assets (FATA). Denis and Mihov (2003) use the fixed assets 
ratio as a proxy for the agency cost of a firm, and they find that firms with low fixed assets ratio is 
assumed to have high growth options in the firm’s investment set. Since a syndicate involving a small 
number of lenders is able to monitor more efficiently, we hypothesize that FATA is positively related to 
the size of a syndicate.
7  
However, the above argument that private debt involving a small number of lenders provides 
more efficient monitoring holds in the absence of Rajan (1992)’s hold-up problems.
8  Rajan (1992) 
emphasizes that private funding comes with costs as well as benefits in the sense that information 
acquired by a private lender could be used to extract rents from the borrower in subsequent financing 
costs.  This is an example of the hold-up problem emphasized by Hart and Moore (1994) in a setting 
involving incomplete contracting.  A syndicate involving a large number of participants may able to avoid 
potential hold-up problems.  Without the hold-up problem, we argue the size of a syndicate should be 
negatively influenced by increased agency problems.  In the presence of potential hold-up problems, 
however, firms with substantial growth opportunities are more likely to rely on many lenders.   
If the agency problems between the borrower and lenders are potentially significant, the 
reputation of the borrower can be a solution to these problems.  Diamond (1991) argues that reputation 
can substitute for the role that monitoring plays in overcoming the moral hazard problems and 
demonstrates that borrowers shift from private sources to the public markets as the borrower develops a 
reputation in the form of a history of successful debt repayments.  Hence syndicated loans represent a 
hybrid of traditional bank loans and capital market instruments, reputable firms are more likely to be 






     
Sharpe (2001) in using the firm’s ratio of long-term debt to total debt (LTDRATIO). A borrower that can 
issue relatively long-term debt is considered more reputable. A positive coefficient is expected on the 
LTDRATIO variable.     
2. Financial Distress 
  The lead arranger’s capacity to syndicate should also depend on the perceptions of borrowers’ 
potential hold-out problems and loan re-negotiability.  Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) examine the 
incentives of financially- distressed firms to choose between private re-negotiation and formal bankruptcy.  
They argue that the severity of hold-out problems will be influenced by the number of creditors, the type 
of debt, and the voting rules.  They hypothesize that the holdout problem becomes more severe when 
there are relatively more lenders participating in the restructuring plan.  The underlying logic is that as the 
number of total votes to be cast increases, the prospect that at least one debt holder will object increases.  
Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) present evidence that firms are more likely to restructure debt privately as 
the ratio of bank debt to total liabilities increases and as borrowers have fewer lenders.   
Preece and Mullineaux (1996) investigate the prospect that contractual flexibility in renegotiating 
private debt might supplement monitoring as a source of value to borrowers.  As the number of lenders 
increases in a syndicate, loan restructurings become more complicated due to potential hold-out problems 
among the syndicate members, suggesting that the size of the market’s reaction to loan announcements 
should be negatively associated with the size of a syndicate.  They find evidence in favor of this 
hypothesis. Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) note that there are four ways banks can respond to 
financial distress.  Banks can loosen financial constraints on borrowers by allowing changes in covenants, 
delay principal and/or interest, and extend additional lines of credit.  Contrarily, banks can tighten 
financial constraints by calling loans and reducing lines of credit. Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein 
(1994) find that banks are more likely to loosen the constraints when they have collateral, but loosening 
financial constraints does not affect the probability of bankruptcy.  
Since the members of the syndicate must unanimously agree to any substantive changes in the 






     
size.  Sizeable syndicates would be especially problematic when potential financial distress is high.
9 To 
measure the borrower’s potential financial distress and associated hold-out problems, we use the ratio of 
the firm’s total debt to total assets (TOTALDEBT), debt-to-equity ratio (DEBTEQUITY), and Altman’s 
Z-score (1977). Since a low Z-Score represents a high probability of financial distress, the signs of these 
financial distress variables are expected to move inversely each other. We argue that as these variables 
increase, syndicate size should decline.   
3. Proprietary Information 
If the borrower’s business success depends strongly on its private information, the firm will have 
significant concerns about information leakage to outsiders, especially to competitors.  In a syndicated 
loan, potential participants are required to sign a confidentiality agreement before they receive the 
information memorandum in order to prevent sensitive information from being disseminated in the 
market.  This requirement, however, may not fully eliminate the borrower’s concerns, since it would be 
difficult and costly to identify the source of any breach of confidentiality.    
Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) find that when firms’ probabilities of success are not influenced 
by their private knowledge, firms prefer multilateral financing to bilateral financing.  On the other hand, if 
the proprietary information can significantly influence firms’ probabilities of success, multilateral 
financing is not preferable, since the prospect of revealing proprietary information to a competitor creates 
incentives to free ride on investments in R&D.  Under bilateral financing, this free-rider problem does not 
occur, because the proprietary information is never disclosed.  In addition, Yosha (1995) notes that the 
degree and cost of information disclosure is different between bilateral and multilateral financing.  Under 
multilateral financing, the borrower is required to disclose detailed information to lenders, because it 
needs to verify its creditworthiness.  Under bilateral financing, on the other hand, a relationship between 
the borrower and lenders is often considered as an important lending decision factor, which implies that 
the borrower can provide less information.  Therefore, bilateral financing is less costly in terms of 






     
to proprietary information choose bilateral financing, while firms that are less sensitive rely on 
multilateral financing. 
We use the ratio of R&D expenditures to firm’s sales (R&D) to measure the relevance of the 
firm’s confidential information.  If the borrower has strong needs for confidentiality, a smaller syndicate 
is preferable, suggesting the sign of R&D is negative. 
4. Profitability  
The profitability of the borrowing firms also can influence size of a syndicate.  Highly profitable 
firms are less costly to monitor and less likely to default.  We expect that more profitable firms will be 
associated with a larger syndicate. 
5. Loan Characteristics  
1) Maturity 
The characteristics of the loan itself could affect the structure of the syndicate. Lee and Mullinaux 
(2004) find a positive relationship between the loan maturity and the syndicate size. Jones et. al. (2000) 
find that maturity positively affects the proportion of a loan sold in syndication, and Sufi (2006) also finds 
that loan maturity is negatively related to the holding shares of the lead bank.  If the borrower’s credit risk 
declines with loan maturity, as the results of Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) imply, we should expect 
larger syndicates for longer-term loans.  
We predict that information problems in syndicated loans  would be  less severe for keiretsu 
firms. This is because keiretsu firms have had close relationships with their main banks which often serve 
as lead agent banks of the syndication and have informational advantage over borrower firms. Sufi (2006) 
presents the adverse selection hypothesis, which seems to be similar for cases of keiretsu syndication. The 
lead agent bank has private information on the borrower firm that is unknown to participant lenders. Thus 
if the adverse selection hypothesis is true, then a lead agent bank with a previous 
relationship with the borrower should be forced to retain more of the loan and form a more concentrated 
syndicate. Therefore we predict that Keiretsu (non-keiretsu) firms will have less (greater) fraction of loan 






     
2) Loan Purpose 
Both the borrower and the agent bank may be concerned about the purpose for which the funds 
will be used.  In our sample, we include dummies for working capital (WORK) and debt repayment 
(REPAY).  The base dummy is general corporate purposes.  Debt repayment loans include facilities for 
refinancing or consolidation of existing debt prior to maturity. If funds are needed for debt repayment or 
recapitalization, the borrower may wish to obtain the financing more quickly, since such loans are likely 
to be used for resolving short-term liquidity problems.
10  Since it takes less time for the agent bank to 
form a smaller syndicate, both the borrower and the agent bank may prefer a smaller syndicate. We 
expect that loans associated with debt repayment should involve smaller number of lenders relative to 
loans with general corporate purposes.  WORK is a dummy equal to one if the loan is used for working 
capital purpose.  
6. Control Variables.  
1) Facility Size 
We control for the effect of facility size on syndicate size, since as the facility size increases, the 
size of the lending syndicate will become larger for either regulatory or diversification-related reasons.  
2) Year  
We include year dummies (results not reported) for each year of the transaction.  We want to 
examine the influence of the variables discussed above, abstracting from any potential trends in syndicate 
formation.   
 
V.  Empirical Analysis 
1. Sample selection and description 
We employ data from the Dealscan database maintained by Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC). 
While this database provides detailed transaction-specific data on loans originated in the U.S., this is not 
the case for loans originated in Japan.  From Dealscan, we could extract 144 facilities that are related to 






     
facility can be defined as a loan deal that involves a number of dissimilarly designed loans with common 
agent and participant banks, made to the same borrower on a given date.  Table 2 provides some 
descriptive statistics for the sample.      
  The average number of syndicate lenders in Japan is 9.6 and the median is 8.  Lee and Mullineaux 
(2004) report a similar average of 9 lenders for the period 1987-95 in the U.S syndicate market, but also 
report a lower median of 5 lenders in the U.S. market.  Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) report that the average 
investment banking underwriting syndicate contains 18.2 members.  The difference is not surprising, 
since the average bond issue is 2 to 4 times the size of the typical syndicated loan, depending on the time 
horizon of comparison.  
The mean size of Japanese borrowers in our sample is very large relative to other samples based 
on U.S. and Korean syndicate market and somewhat skewed with a mean of $24.9 billion and median of 
$12.4 billion. The average asset size in this sample is about more than 9 times that of the U. S. firms in 
Lee and Mullineaux's (2004) sample.  The mean loan facility size in our sample is $459 million, which is 
larger than the various averages observed in the U.S. market by Lee and Mullineaux (2004) and Jones, 
Lang and Nigro (2000), which fall in the $150-$220 million range. These differences in descriptive 
statistics among the three studies, however, may not provide significant implication since the time 
horizon of comparison is not matched.  
The mean debt-to-equity ratio for this study is 4.7, and the median is 3.9.  The Korean sample 
shows a similar debt-to-equity ratio of 4.4.  The means of Japanese firms’ ROA and ROE are 0.7% 
and1.9%, respectively. Regardless of different time horizon being compared, the poor Japanese firms’ 
profitability reflects a long period of economic recession in Japan.  Finally, the purpose of loans in this 
sample is designated mainly as general corporate purpose and etc. of 84%, debt repayment of 11%, and 
working capital of 14%.    
A correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables is provided in Table 3. We find positive 
correlations between SIZE and agency conflicts variables (ASSETS, SALES, FATA, LTDRATIO, 






     
ZSCORE).  Consistent with the proprietary information hypothesis, we find a negative correlation 
between SIZE and R&D.  SIZE is positively correlated with the proxy for loan purpose variables (WORK, 
REPAY).  Also SIZE is positively correlated with FACSIZE, as expected.  Due to the high correlations, 
we separately regress SIZE on ASSETS and SALES, TOTALDEBT and DEBTEQUITY, and ROA and 
ROE for estimation purpose.  
Descriptive statistics which provide us with a sense of understanding differences and similarities 
in financial performance by keiretsu firms and non-keiretsu firms are provided in Table 4.  Most 
interestingly, the size of a syndicated loan (i.e.,, the number of banks participating in a syndicate) shows 
that keiretsu firms have much smaller of banks in a syndication than non-keiretsu firms. The mean 
(median) values of syndicated loan size are 11.38 (10.5) for non-keiretsu firms and 8.03 (7) for keiretsu 
firms, respectively. The mean and median values for total assets show that there are no statistically 
significant differences between keiretsu firms and non-keiretsu firms. On the hand, the mean annual sales 
for keiretsu firms and that for non-keiretsu firms are statistically significantly different at 5 percent level. 
We also find that leverage (TOTAL DEBT) for keiretsu firms are higher and this is statically significant. 
Finally, we find that loan maturity is statistically significantly longer for non-keiretsu firms, while there 
are no statistical significant differences in mean and median for the size of syndicate loan amount facility. 
2.  Model Estimation 
  The dependent variable in the model we estimate is the total number of banks participating in the 
syndicate.  Since this variable is discrete and non-negative, we employ Poisson regression as the 
estimation technique.
 13  The results for the syndicate size for the full are presented in Tables 5.   
We employ the size of the firm to measure the scope of information problems between the 
borrower and lenders.  Similar to Lee and Mullineaux (2004), the coefficients of the information proxies 
(ASSETS and SALES) are positively signed and significant in all specifications.  These results are 
consistent with our initial information problem hypothesis that more lenders are likely to participate in a 
syndicate when borrower information is “transparent,” assuming firm size is a signal regarding the quality 






     
value of assets (FATA).  Firms with higher fixed asset ratios have relatively lower growth options in their 
investment opportunity set.  We find that the coefficient of FATA is positive in all specifications and 
generally highly significant, suggesting that borrowers with low growth options are able to attract more 
lenders to a syndicate.  This variable is incorrectly signed according to the hold-up problem hypothesis 
that Firms with flexible growth options may prefer larger syndicates to prevent an individual bank from 
extracting rents in the loan renewal stage, in the sense of Rajan (1992).  
The coefficient of LTDRATIO is positive and highly significant in every equation, implying that 
reputable borrowers appeal to more lenders.  Lee and Mullineaux (2004) and Dennis and Mullineaux 
(2000) found that agent’s reputation was the primary mechanism for controlling agency problems within 
the lending group.  In this paper, we could not examine the role of agent’s reputation in Japan syndication 
market, because we could not determine the identity of the agent bank in our database.  Similar to Lee and 
Mullineaux (2003), we analyzed instead whether the borrower’s reputation affects the size of syndicate. 
Our findings suggest that as borrowers become more reputable (i.e., firms have been able to raise larger 
portions of longer-term debt relative to total debt), they attract larger syndicates.   
Loan characteristics, such as maturity, could serve to attenuate agency problems between the 
agent and syndicate members.   MATURITY is again positive but insignificant, which does not support 
our hypothesis that longer maturity results in a large syndicate, presumably because long-term loans save 
on duplicative monitoring costs for the syndicate banks.  Also, our findings are not consistent with the 
notion that short maturities, and consequent frequent re-contracting, are a solution to potential agency 
problems within the syndicate.  
Borrowers’ leverage ratios and Z-score are a proxy for the potential hold-out problems, financial 
distress or the borrower’s observable risk.  The coefficients of TOTALDEBT and DEBTEQUITY are 
negative, and ZSCORE is positive. As noted before, a low Z-Score represents a high probability of 
financial distress.  These variables are strongly significant in all of our specifications, suggesting that 
borrowers with higher potential for financial distress appear to choose smaller syndicates in order to avoid 






     
syndicates when the borrower is likely to be in financial distress, because the agent will have higher 
administrative costs in a restructuring when there are many lenders.  Therefore, both the borrower and the 
agent prefer a smaller syndicate if the borrower is likely to be in financial distress. 
The R&D variable, which we hypothesize as a proxy for the relevance of proprietary information, 
is highly significant and the sign is negative.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms 
with high R&D expenditures will place a high value on confidentiality and thus prefer a smaller syndicate.   
  The coefficients of ROA and ROE are significant, but the sign is negative.
11  While we initially 
expect that syndicate lenders prefer more profitable borrowers, our results are not consistent with the 
hypothesis.  One possible explanation is that the agent bank might prefer to raise their exposure to 
borrowers with high profitability by opting for relatively large portions.      
  The control variable, FACSZ, is positive and strongly significant.  The larger the facility, the 
larger is the syndicate size. Variables regarding the purpose of loan are generally significant.  The 
coefficients of WORK and REPAY are positive and highly significant, indicating that loans used for 
working capital and debt repayment purposes are associated with larger syndicates relative to loans for 
general corporate purposes.  The positive sign on REPAY is not consistent with our initial expectation 
that debt repayment loans are related to a smaller syndicate, since these loans are presumed to resolve 
short-term liquidity constraints. The keiretsu dummy (KEIRETSU, equal to one if the borrower belongs 
to  Keiretsu) coefficients for all equations in Table 5 shows strong negative sign, and this calls for 
conducting further analysis of panel study for both keiretsu firms and non-keiretsu firms. The results are 
given in Table 6 and 7. 
The keiretsu firm regression results of Table 6 are quite different from the full sample results of 
Table 5, while the non-keiretsu (independent) firm regression results of Table 7 are similar to the full 
sample results. Because of the discreteness of dependent variables, we use Poisson regression results in 
our analysis. Table 6 shows that FATA (the borrower’s fixed assets to its book value of assets) has 
statistically significant positive coefficients in all estimation equations, while LTDRATIO (the ratio of 






     
consistent with the view by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Sharfstein (1990) who argue that financial ties between 
main banks and their client firms reduce information asymmetry and incentive problems, allow financial 
flexibility for firms, so that firms may continue to proceed with ongoing projects.  
In Table 7, both total assets (ASSETS) and annual sales (SALES) have a strong positive sign. 
This implies that transparent non-keiretsu firms are more likely to have more banks in the syndicate as a 
result of reduced information asymmetry problems. Also, Table 7 shows that both leverage 
(TOTALDEBT) and debt-equity ratio (DEBTEQUITY) have a strong negative sign.  The majority of 
coefficients (6 out of 8) for Altman’s z-score (ZSCORE) turn out to be statistically significantly positive 
in Table 7, indicating that firms with high low liquidity tends to have smaller syndication group. This 
suggests that higher credit risk is negatively related to the number of banks in a syndicate, a finding 
consistent with Lee and Mullineaux (2004) for the US case. Also, it appears that syndicates are structured 
to enhance monitoring efforts and to facilitate renegotiation if borrowers become financially distressed. 
Finally, the OLS regression results using a syndicated loan holding share of lead manager bank are 
provided in Table 8 through 10. We find a sharp contrast in the relationship between lead agent’s holding 
share for both keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms. The maturity of syndicated loans is an important factor in 
determining the loan share of lead agent bank in a syndicate. Keiretsu firms have less fraction of loan by 
the agent bank as the maturity rises, while non-keiretsu firms have greater fraction of loan by the agent 
bank as the maturity rises. It appears that main banks of keiretsu firms with informational advantage 
are likely to retain less of the loan and form a more dispersed syndicate to "signal' that the loan is of high 
quality. This further confirms the view that information problems are less severe in the keiretsu firms. 
This further confirms the view that information problems are less severe in the keiretsu firms. In 
Table 10, we also find that coefficients for both the firm leverage (TOTALDEBT) and the debt-equity 
ratio (DEBTEQUITY) turn out to be significantly negative in all equations. Financial distress in non-
keiretsu firms appears to discourage lead agent banks hold greater portion of loan in the syndicate, while 
this pattern is not statistically significant for keiretsu firms. This again confirms the value of durable 






     
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
This paper focuses on the factors that influence the number of lenders in syndicates formed for 
the purpose of selling business loans originated in Japan.  The syndication market in Japan is large 
(almost 20 trillion yen as of March 31, 2004) and has grown steadily.  However, there is only a limited 
body of research on this important form of financing and no research on lending syndicates originated in 
Japan.  Syndicated loans are an interesting phenomenon, since they are a hybrid of “traditional” bank 
loans (often referred to as “relationship lending”) and capital market instruments (“transaction lending”).  
Using Japanese syndicated loan market data, during the 1999-2003 period we find that syndicates 
are smaller when Japanese borrowers have higher credit risk and involve greater information asymmetry 
(as measured by sales and total assets).  This is consistent with the view of small syndicates’ enhanced 
monitoring and renegotiation hypothesis by Lee and Mullineaux (2004). The results are primarily driven 
by  non-keiretsu (non-business group) firms. This supports the notion that the scale and scope of 
information asymmetries are relevant to how many banks will participate in a syndicate, especially for 
banks participating in a Japanese syndicated loan for non-keiretsu firms.  
Information problems however seem to be less severe for keiretsu firms which tend to have easier 
access to syndicated loan via the intermediation of in-house banks in the syndicate.  This is consistent 
with the view by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Sharfstein (1990) who argue that financial ties between main banks 
and their client firms reduce information asymmetry and incentive problems, allow financial flexibility 
for firms, so that firms may continue to proceed with ongoing projects.  
Our research is partially motivated by agency theory, which emphasizes the role of information 
and incentives in financial contracting.  Theory and evidence suggest that debt claims are more 
marketable as information about the borrower becomes more available and is more credible.  We estimate 
a model that relates the size of a syndicate group to the quality of the information about the borrower, to 






     
exploit the other participants in the loan transaction, to potential financial distress of the borrower, and to 
the proprietary information regarding the borrower.   
  We also find evidence that as the borrower’s reputation capital increases, as reflected in the ratio 
of long-term debt to total debt, relatively more lenders participate in a syndicate, because some of the 
agency problems between the borrower and lenders can be mitigated by the borrower’s reputation.   
Instead of the borrower’s side, Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) find that the proportion of a loan can be 
syndicated increases as the managing agent becomes more reputable.  Our research also supports the 
notion that relationships are a potential mechanism for attenuating agency problems in debt contracting.   
The evidence regarding the individual loan’s characteristics, such as maturity, does not appear to 
support the hypothesis that potential agency problems between the agent and the syndicate members can 
be resolved by the loan’s characteristics.  Finance theory suggests that keeping contractual relations brief 
can reduce potential agency problems.  By this logic, maturity should be negatively related to the size of a 
syndicate.  Our evidence is to the contrary.  Lengthening a loan’s maturity, an agent can form a larger 
syndicate, though not significant.  Longer maturity increases the size of a syndicate, probably because it 
results in reduced duplicative monitoring costs within the syndicate. Lead banks form smaller syndicates 
when the borrower’s financial risk is high in order to reduce potential hold-out problems and 
consequently restructure the loan more efficiently.  The R&D variable, which we hypothesize as a proxy 
for the relevance of proprietary information with a consequent negative sign, is significant in our various 
estimations with a negative sign.  Our results support the hypothesis that firms will prefer smaller 
syndicates to protect information leakage to competitors.  
Finally, we find that the maturity of syndicated loans is an important factor in determining the 
loan share of lead agent bank in a syndicate. Keiretsu (non-keiretsu) firms have less (greater) fraction of 
loan by the agent bank as the maturity rises. It appears that main banks of keiretsu firms with 
informational advantage are  likely to retain less of the loan and form a more dispersed syndicate to 
"signal' that the loan is of high quality with increased maturity. This further confirms the view that 






     
 
Table 1 
Description of the Variables in the Models 
 
Variable Description 
Agency Conflicts  
--Information Variables 
ASSETS  The natural logarithm of the book value of borrower’s assets. 
SALES  The natural logarithm of the borrower’s annual sales. 
--Agency Problems Between the Borrower and Lenders 
FATA  The borrower’s fixed assets to its book value of assets. 
LTDRATIO  The ratio of the borrower’s long-term debt to total debt. 
Financial Distress   
TOTALDEBT  The ratio of the borrower’s total debt to total assets.   
DEBTEQUITY  The ratio of the borrower’s total debt to total equity. 
ZSCORE  Altman’s Z-score. Defined as 
(3.3*EBIT/SALES+1*SALES/TA+1.4*RE/TA+1.2*WC/TA), where EBIT is 
earnings before interest and taxes, RE is retained earnings, and WC is working 
capital. 
Proprietary Information 
R&D  The ratio of the borrower’s R&D expenditures to sales 
Profitability and Fee  
ROA  The borrower’s return on assets. 
ROE  The borrower’s return on equity 
Loan Characteristics 
MATURITY  The length of loan maturity in months.  
WORK  Dummy variable equal to 1 if loan purpose is working capital and 0 otherwise. 
REPAY  Dummy variable equal to 1 if loan purpose is debt repayment and 0 otherwise. 
Control Variables  
FACSIZE  The natural logarithm of the size of the loan facility. 
Year  Dummy  Dummy variables for the years  (2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003) of loan 



















     
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for the Model Variables 
The sample is obtained from Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan database and covers the period 
1999-2003.  Size is the number of institutions participating in a syndicate, including the arranging 
bank. The remaining variables are defined in Table 1. 
Variable MEAN  MEDIAN  MAX  MIN 
SIZE 9.61  8  31  2 
ASSETS 
($, million) 
24985.8 12401.8 153198  2145 
SALES  
($, million) 
24261.5 11169.5 141735.2  137 
FATA  0.40 0.34 0.91 0.03 
LTDRATIO  0.46 0.44 0.81 0.03 
TOTALDEBT  0.74 0.79 0.94 0.27 
DEBTEQUITY 4.68  3.99  17.31  0.38 
ZSCORE 1.52 1.28 16  -1.78 
R&D 0.0000287  0.0000125  0.000388  0 
ROA 0.00744  0.00635  0.1785  -0.0966 
ROE 0.0193  0.0379  0.553  -0.385 
MATURITY 
(months) 
34.5 12  240  6 
WORK 
 
0.055 0  1  0 
REPAY 0.111  0  1  0 
FACSIZE  
($, million) 















     
Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Matrix  
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics: Keiretsu firms vs. Non- Keiretsu firms 
 
 NON-KEIRETSU  KEIRETSU  DIFFERENCE 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-test  Median  p-value 
SIZE  11.38  10.5  8.03 7 3.35  3.17  3.5  0.00 
ASSET(million dollar)  28.893  11.866  21.318 14.329  7.575 1.64 -2.462  0.40 
SALES(million  dollar)  18.743 10.300 29.183 13.800 -10.00  -2.11 -3.500  0.14 
FATA  0.478 0.351 0.329 0.283 0.149  4.00  0.067  0.00 
LTDRATIO  0.514 0.469 0.422 0.432 0.092  3.33  0.036  0.01 
TOTAL  DEBT  0.686 0.749 0.794 0.810 -0.107  -4.66  -0.060 0.00 
DEBT  EQUITY  3.493 3.011 5.748 4.925 -2.254  -4.28  -1.913 0.00 
Z-SCORE  1.764 1.310 1.304 1.277 0.460  1.51  0.032  0.71 
R&D  0.0027 0.0013 0.0030 0.0008 -0.0003  -0.32 0.0004  0.02 
ROA  0.0154 0.0144 0.0002 0.0008  0.015  3.67  0.011  0.00 
ROE 0.0474  0.0455  -0.0059  0.0165  0.053  3.16  0.029  0.00 
MATURITY  51.882 12 27.881 12  24.00  3.04  0  0.03 
FACSIZE(million  dollar)  0.410 0.238 0.504 0.274  -0.0934  -0.85 -0.0359  0.56 
ASSETS is the natural logarithm of the book value of borrower’s assets. SALES is the natural logarithm of the borrower’s 
annual sales. FATA is the borrower’s fixed assets to its book value of assets. LTDRATIO is The ratio of the borrower’s 
long-term debt to total debt. TOTALDEBT is the ratio of the borrower’s total debt to total assets. DEBTEQUITY is the 
ratio of the borrower’s total debt to total equity. ZSCORE is Altman’s z-score. R&D is the ratio of the borrower’s R&D 
expenditures to sales. ROA is the borrower’s return on assets. ROE is the borrower’s return on equity. MATURITY is the 








     
Table 5  Estimation Results of Poisson Regressions for Syndicate Size:  
Full Sample of Japanese Borrowers 
 
Equation  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable  SIZE 
ASSETS  0.1257***  0.1384*** 0.1244*** 0.1419***         
  (2.60)  (2.78) (2.58) (2.85)         
SALES        0.1052***  0.1223***  0.0919***  0.1112*** 
        (2.82)  (3.15)  (2.50)  (2.88) 
FATA  0.1676  0.0537 0.1246 0.0206  0.4079***  0.3347**  0.3322**  0.2780 
  (1.08)  (0.34) (0.81) (0.13) (2.36) (1.96)  (1.95) (1.64) 
LTDRATIO  0.1988  0.1892 0.1837 0.1645 0.2400 0.2274  0.2359 0.2156 
  (1.02)  (0.97) (0.94) (0.84) (1.25) (1.19)  (1.22) (1.12) 
TOTALDEBT  -0.6919**   -0.5852**  -0.5978**  -0.4652*   
  (-2..35)   (-1.99)  (-2.12)   (-1.65)  
DEBTEQUITY    -0.0314***  -0.0302***  -0.0303***    -0.0277** 
    (-2.56)   -2.46   (-2.25)   (-2.32) 
ZSCORE 0.0232  0.3462**  0.0134  0.0225  0.0554***  0.0690***  0.0414**  0.0525*** 
  (1.34)  (2.26) (0.78) (1.50) (2.86) (3.72)  (2.19) (2.95) 
R&D  -31.7208***  -31.5478*** -33.1035*** -33.6943*** -25.0106*** -24.5213***  -28.1017*** -28.5214*** 
  (-3.66)  (-3.69) (-3.71) (-3.81) (-2.83) (-2.80)  (-3.11) (-3.19) 
ROA -5.5908***  -5.4495***      -6.1791***  -6.1803***     
 (-3.77)  (-3.71)      (-4.07)  (-4.10)     
ROE     -0.6979**  -0.7470**      -07723**  -0.8444*** 
     (-2.11)  (-2.24)      (-2.31)  (-2.49) 
MATURITY  -0.00009  0.000007 -0.00007 -0.00003 -0.00019 -0.00009  -0.00013 -0.00003 
  (-0.14)  (0.01) (-0.11) (0.05) (-0.30) (-0.15)  (-0.20) (-0.05) 
WORK  0.6566***  0.6305*** 0.6592*** 0.6362*** 0.6903*** 0.6729***  0.6901*** 0.6566*** 
  (6.28)  (6.05) (6.30) (6.10) (6.54) (6.42)  (6.53) (6.28) 
REPAY  0.2479***  0.2318*** 0.2246**  0.2121** 0.2316*** 0.2134** 0.2084**  0.1934** 
  (2.63)  (2.46) (2.40) (2.26) (2.46) (2.26)  (2.23) (2.06) 
KEIRETU    -0.3015***  -0.3162*** -0.2891*** -0.3009*** -0.3031*** -0.3135***  -0.2872*** -0.2937*** 
  (-4.13)  (-4.45) (-3.94) (-4.22) (-4.14) (-4.42)  (-3.92) (-4.13) 
FACSIZE  0.1140***  0.1055*** 0.1230*** 0.1152*** 0.1154*** 0.1066***  0.1305*** 0.1240*** 
  (3.51)  (3.20) (3.79) (3.51) (3.69) (3.41)  (4.21) (4.03) 
Constant  -0.6757  -1.1322*  -0.8329 -1.3000** -0.5754 -1.0565**  -0.6159 -1.0718** 
  (-1.17)  (-1.82) (-1.45) (-2.08) (-1.11) (-1.91)  (-1.18) (-1.92) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Year Dummy 
N  144  144 144 144 144 144  144 144 
Pseudo-R²  0.1732  0.1742 0.1640 0.1660 0.1743 0.1762  0.1637 0.1661 
This table reports the effects of agency conflicts, financial distress, proprietary information, and proprietary information on  the number of 
institutions participating in a syndicate.  ASSETS is the natural logarithm of the book value of borrower’s assets. SALES is the natural logarithm of 
the borrower’s annual sales. FATA is the borrower’s fixed assets to its book value of assets. LTDRATIO is The ratio of the borrower’s long-term 
debt to total debt. TOTALDEBT is the ratio of the borrower’s total debt to total assets. DEBTEQUITY is the ratio of the borrower’s total debt to 
total equity. ZSCORE is Altman’s z-score. R&D is the ratio of the borrower’s R&D expenditures to sales. ROA is the borrower’s return on assets. 
ROE is the borrower’s return on equity. MATURITY is the length of loan maturity in months. WORK is a dummy variable equal to 1 if loan 
purpose is working capital and 0 otherwise. REPAY is a dummy variable equal to 1 if loan purpose is debt repayment and 0 otherwise.  KEIRETSU 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower belongs to keiretsu and 0 otherwise. FACSIZE is the natural logarithm of the size of the loan facility. 
Figures are Poisson regression coefficient estimates, and z-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance 







     
Table 6 Estimation Results of Poisson Regressions for Syndicate Size: Keiretsu  
 
Equation  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
Dependent Variable  SIZE 
ASSETS 0.0238  0.0765  0.0269  0.0832         
 (0.21)  (0.69)  (0.23)  (0.75)         
SALES         0.1376  0.1688*  0.1408  0.1738** 
         (1.45)  (1.84)  (1.48)  (1.90) 
FATA  1.9237***  1.7660*** 1.9241*** 1.7598*** 1.7794*** 1.6722***  1.7714*** 1.6577*** 
  (4.41)  (4.27) (4.35) (4.20) (4.06) (4.03)  (3.97)  (3.93) 
LTDRATIO  -0.9214**  -0.9564** -0.9065** -0.9480** -0.8488** -0.8508**  -0.8274** -0.8301** 
  (-2.04)  (-2.02) (-2.00) (-1.99) (-2.03) (-2.03)  (-1.98)  (-1.98) 
TOTALDEBT  0.9463   0.9617  0.2408   0.2515   
  (1.03)   (1.04)  (0.28)   (0.29)   
DEBTEQUITY   0.0091    0.0084    -0.0048    -0.0052 
   (0.42)    (0.39)    (-0.24)    (0.798) 
ZSCORE 0.2455*  0.1853  0.2435*  0.1816  0.0810  0.0329  0.0740  0.0230 
  (1.86)  (1.59) (1.81) (1.53) (0.48) (0.22)  (0.43)  (0.15) 
R&D  -8.4482  -14.0583 -7.6884 -13.4812 -6.4736  -7.9402  -5.5942  -7.1269 
  (-0.72)  (-1.35) (-0.66) (-1.30) (-0.59) (-0.75)  (-0.51)  (-0.68) 
ROA -2.2684  -2.4181      -1.9132  -1.8832     
 (-1.09)  (-1.16)      (-0.91)  (-0.90)     
ROE     -0.3863  -0.4193      -0.2990  -0.2924 
     (-0.85)  (-0.93)      (-0.66)  (-0.64) 
MATURITY  -0.0032*  -0.0030* -0.0032* -0.0030*  -0.0027  -0.0026  -0.0027  -0.00258 
  (-1.84)  (-1.74) (-1.84) (-1.73) (-1.56) (-1.47)  (-1.56)  (-1.46) 
WORK 0.2801*  0.2698*  0.2787*  0.2675*  0.2476  0.2352  0.2438  0.2305 
  (1.74)  (1.67) (1.72) (1.64) (1.53) (1.44)  (1.50)  (1.41) 
REPAY  0.6858***  0.6599*** 0.6801*** 0.6506*** 0.6112*** 0.5818***  0.6069*** 0.5758*** 
  (4.32)  (4.00) (4.25) (3.91) (3.85) (3.54)  (3.81)  (3.50) 
FACSIZE 0.0808*  0.0877*  0.0863*  0.0937**  0.0658  0.0672  0.0701  0.0714 
  (1.72)  (1.87) (1.84) (2.00) (1.40) (1.43)  (1.48)  (1.51) 
Constant  -0.4490  -0.5711 -0.5940 -0.7625 -1.4011 -1.6288  -1.5211  -1.7620 
  (-0.34)  (-0.37   )
Yes 
(-0.4 )  5
Yes 
(-0.49   )
Yes 
(-1.28   )
Yes 
(-1.29   )
Yes 
(-1.39   )
Yes 
(-1.41   )
Yes  Year Dummy  Yes 
N  76  76 76 76 76 76  76  76 
Pseudo-R²  0.1586  0.1570 0.1577 0.1560 0.1624 0.1624  0.1616  0.1616 
 
 This table reports the effects of agency conflicts, financial distress, proprietary information, and proprietary information on the number of 
institutions participating in a syndicate.  ASSETS is the natural logarithm of the book value of borrower’s assets. SALES is the natural 
logarithm of the borrower’s annual sales. FATA is the borrower’s fixed assets to its book value of assets. LTDRATIO is The ratio of the 
borrower’s long-term debt to total debt. TOTALDEBT is the ratio of the borrower’s total debt to total assets. DEBTEQUITY is the ratio of the 
borrower’s total debt to total equity. ZSCORE is Altman’s z-score. R&D is the ratio of the borrower’s R&D expenditures to sales. ROA is the 
borrower’s return on assets. ROE is the borrower’s return on equity. MATURITY is the length of loan maturity in months. WORK is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if loan purpose is working capital and 0 otherwise. REPAY is a dummy variable equal to 1 if loan purpose is debt repayment 
and 0 otherwise. FACSIZE is the natural logarithm of the size of the loan facility. Figures are Poisson regression coefficient estimates, and z-








     
Table 7 Estimation Results of Poisson Regressions for Syndicate Size: Non-Keiretsu 
 
Equation  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
Dependent Variable  SIZE 
ASSETS 0.2479***  0.2597***  0.2598***  0.2724***         
 (3.89)  (4.05)  (4.09)  (4.26)         
SALES         0.1934***  0.2011***  0.1995***  0.2068*** 
         (3.53)  (3.65)  3.64  (3.76) 
FATA -0.0899  -0.1327  -0.1796  -0.2022  0.2631  0.2412  0.1837  0.1803 
 (-0.41)  (-0.62)  (-0.83)  (-0.94)  (1.18)  (1.10)  (0.83)  (0.83) 
LTDRATIO 0.5479**  0.6240***  0.4006*  0.4709**  0.5399**  0.6027**  0.3910  0.4452* 
  (2.16)  (2.49) (1.63) (1.94) (2.10) (2.36)  (1.56)  (1.80) 
TOTALDEBT  -1.0034***    -0.9308***   -0.8169**   -0.7274**   
  (-2.75)   (-2.56)  (-2..26)   (-2.02)   
DEBTEQUITY    -0.07325***   -0.0697***  -0.0609***    -0.0558*** 
    (-3.15)  (-2.98)  (-2.68)    (-2.43) 
ZSCORE 0.0287  0.0438***  0.0106  0.0237  0.0863***  0.1004***  0.0696***  0.0815*** 
  (1.46)  (2.52) (0.57) (1.47) (3.49) (4.34)  (2.90)  (3.67) 
R&D -44.4522**  -37.0558**  -67.0565***  -61.8314*** -46.3238**  -41.1494**  -68.8419*** -65.6105*** 
  (-1.96)  (-1.71) (-3.07) (-2.95) (-2.14) (-1.97)  (-3.31)  (-3.27) 
ROA -8.2413  -9.1140***      -8.5081***  -9.2526***     
 (-3.44)  (-3.85)      (-3.57)  (-3.90)     
ROE     -1.2645*  -1.7214**      -1.2736*  -1.6434** 
     (-1.80)  (-2.42)      (-1.82)  (-2.31) 
MATURITY  -0.00101  -0.00042 -0.00114 -0.00067 -0.00107 -0.00057  -0.0012 -0.00081 
  (-2.57)  (-0.51) (-1.42) (-0.80) (-1.37) (-0.69)  (-1.49)  (-0.96) 
WORK  1.4799***  1.5065*** 1.5023*** 1.5389*** 1.4737*** 1.4978***  1.4977***  1.5298*** 
  (8.16)  (8.22) (8.29) (8.38) (8.12) (8.19)  (8.26)  (8.34) 
REPAY 0.0034  0.0468  -0.0289  0.0179  -0.0389  -0.0042  -0.0768  -0.0398 
  (0.02)  (0.31) (-0.20) (0.12) (0.27) (-0.03)  (-0.53)  (-0.27) 
FACSIZE 0.0694  0.0360  0.0840  0.0564  0.1072**  0.0822*  0.1250***  0.1058** 
  (1.33)  (0.68) (1.62) (1.08) (2.26) (1.73)  (2.65)  (2.26) 
Constant  -1.8650**  -2.2177***  -2.1242***  -2.4997*** -1.7219** -2.0060***  -1.9396**  -2.2225*** 
  (-2.30)  (-2.75   )
Yes 
(-2.6 )  2
Yes 
(-3.10   )
Yes 
(-2.09   )
Yes 
(-2.47   )
Yes 
(-2.35   )
Yes 
(-2.74   )
Yes  Year Dummy  Yes 
N  68  68 68 68 68 68  68  68 
Pseudo-R²  0.3027  0.3074 0.2875 0.2920 0.2982 0.3022  0.2816  0.2851 
This table reports the effects of agency conflicts, financial distress, proprietary information, and proprietary information on the number of institutions 
participating in a syndicate.  ASSETS is the natural logarithm of the book value of borrower’s assets. SALES is the natural logarithm of the borrower’s 
annual sales. FATA is the borrower’s fixed assets to its book value of assets. LTDRATIO is The ratio of the borrower’s long-term debt to total debt. 
TOTALDEBT is the ratio of the borrower’s total debt to total assets. DEBTEQUITY is the ratio of the borrower’s total debt to total equity. ZSCORE is 
Altman’s z-score. R&D is the ratio of the borrower’s R&D expenditures to sales. ROA is the borrower’s return on assets. ROE is the borrower’s return 
on equity. MATURITY is the length of loan maturity in months. WORK is a dummy variable equal to 1 if loan purpose is working capital and 0 
otherwise. REPAY is a dummy variable equal to 1 if loan purpose is debt repayment and 0 otherwise. FACSIZE is the natural logarithm of the size of 
the loan facility. Figures are Poisson regression coefficient estimates, and z-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * respectively indicate 







     
Table 8  OLS Regression Results for Full Sample of Borrowers: Lead Agent Share 
 
Equation (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Dependent 
Variable  % Held by Lead Agent 
ASSETS  2.9596 2.4435 3.0513  2.5618         
  (0.76) (0.61) (0.79)  (0.64)         
SALES        -0.1722  -0.1774  0.14540  0.2851 
        (-0.07)  (-0.07)  (0.06)  (0.10) 
FATA  9.1691 6.0236  10.9650  7.6891  9.4283 7.2780  11.7399 9.5394 
  (1.01) (0.59) (1.21)  (0.76)  (0.90) (0.67) (1.12) (0.88) 
LTDRATIO  -12.9870 -13.2189 -13.2075  -13.5597 -9.0634  -9.8924  -9.4408  -10.4656 
  (-1.13) (-1.14) (-1.13)  (-1.15)  (-0.87) (-0.94) (-0.89) (-0.98) 
TOTALDEBT  -37.8524*  -40.0527*   -29.8693  -32.3586   
  (-1.82)   (1.88   (-1.52)  (-1.63)  
DEBTEQUITY   -1.0061   -1.1105   -.7124  -0.8536 
   (-1.20)  (1.33)  (-0.87)  (-1.06) 
ZSCORE  -1.2928  -.4317 -1.1799  -0.2360  -1.0974 -.3899 -0.9220 -0.1039 
  (-1.51) (-0.78) (-1.45)  (-0.48)  (-1.11) (-0.46) (-0.97) (-0.12) 
R&D  390.0735 504.7533 342.2169 457.308 423.2596 526.8324 395.1659 505.3652 
  (0.80) (1.03) (0.70)  (0.93)  (0.88) (1.10) (0.83) (1.06) 
ROA  9.0913 22.1437      9.1126 21.3030     
  (0.14) (0.33)      (0.15) (0.34)     
ROE     -16.4259  -15.8597     -16.0079  -15.4957 
     (-0.89)  (-0.86)     (-0.87)  (-0.83) 
MATURITY  0.0312 0.0281 0.0276  0.0243 0.037 0.0324 0.0335 0.0278 
  (0.64) (0.56) (0.56)  (0.48)  (0.76) (0.64) (0.67) (0.55) 
WORK  1.1910 0.3157 1.3613  0.4139  1.2904 0.6143 1.5282 0.7870 
  (0.20) (0.05) (0.23)  (0.07)  (0.21) (0.10) (0.25) (0.13) 
REPAY  -13.5122*** -13.9809*** -13.0288** -13.4618** -13.3891**  -13.7168**  -12.9979**  -13.3545** 
  (-2.48) (-2.42) (-2.27)  (-2.20)  (-2.40) (-2.34) (-2.23) (-2.17) 
KEIRETSU  4.7792 3.0115 4.4487  2.5322  5.0100 3.3736 4.6906  2.9232 
  (1.04) (0.64) (0.95)  (0.52)  (1.09) (0.72) (1.00) (0.60) 
FACSIZE  0.6342 0.2628 0.7335  0.3175  1.6681 1.1561 1.6654 1.0698 
  (0.24) (0.10) (0.29)  (0.13)  (0.64) (0.47)  (0.67) (0.45) 
Constant  9.8151 -0.1520 8.5526  -2.3694  40.8428  28.9469  37.0619  22.6009 
  (0.24) (-0.00) (0.21)  (-0.05)  (1.30) (0.79)  (1.17) (0.61) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Year Dummy 
N  139 139 139  139  139 139 139 139 
R²  0.1501 0.1361 0.1555  0.1406  0.1443 0.1324 0.1494 0.1367 
This table reports the effects of agency conflicts, financial distress, proprietary information, and proprietary information on the holding share of 
agent banks.  ASSETS is the natural logarithm of the book value of borrower’s assets. SALES is the natural logarithm of the borrower’s annual 
sales. FATA is the borrower’s fixed assets to its book value of assets. LTDRATIO is The ratio of the borrower’s long-term debt to total debt. 
TOTALDEBT is the ratio of the borrower’s total debt to total assets. DEBTEQUITY is the ratio of the borrower’s total debt to total equity. 
ZSCORE is Altman’s z-score. R&D is the ratio of the borrower’s R&D expenditures to sales. ROA is the borrower’s return on assets. ROE is 
the borrower’s return on equity. MATURITY is the length of loan maturity in months. WORK is a dummy variable equal to 1 if loan purpose is 
working capital and 0 otherwise. REPAY is a dummy variable equal to 1 if loan purpose is debt repayment and 0 otherwise. KEREITSU is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower belongs to Keiretsu and 0 otherwise. FACSIZE is the natural logarithm of the size of the loan facility. 
Figures are OLS regression coefficient estimates, and t-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance 







     
Table 9 OLS Regression Results for Sub-sample of Keiretsu Borrowers:  
Lead Agent Share  
 
Equation  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
% Held by Lead Agent  Dependent Variable 
-4.8746  -7.3063 -4.2551 -6.6720        ASSETS 
  (-0.78)  (-1.21) (-0.70) (-1.15)         
SALES        -6.3089  -7.9938*  -6.4338  -8.0791* 
        (-1.37)  (-1.76)  (-1.41)  (-1.82) 
-37.7356  -29.9995  -33.3515 -25.7502  -37.1647  -30.3560 -31.5047 -24.8155  FATA 
(-1.50)  (-1.27) (-1.32) (-1.10)  (-1.50)  (-1.28) (-1.27) (-1.06)   
5.7217  6.8830  4.3102  5.1938 -0.9108 -2.8080  -1.3418  -3.1769  LTDRATIO 
(0.22)  (0.26) (0.17) (0.20)  (-0.04)  (-0.12) (-0.05) (-0.13)   
TOTALDEBT  -35.4050   -38.8970  -26.0754   -25.2791   
(-0.77)   (-0.84)  (-0.62)   (-0.60)     
DEBTEQUITY    -0.1715  -0.2611   -.0230  -.0180 
    (-0.16)  (-0.25)  (-0.02)    (-0.02) 
-8.5755  -6.2436  -7.3383 -4.9436 -3.8490  -1.019 -1.9943 .7753  ZSCORE 
  (-1.22)  (-1.04) (-1.03) (-0.82) (-0.48) (-0.14)  (-0.24)  (0.11) 
R&D  -575.572  -357.6789 -549.8812 -325.8481 -894.4529 -819.2869  -836.9613  -763.3528 
  (-0.82)  (-0.58) (-0.78) (-0.53) (-1.47) (-1.48)  (-1.40)  (-1.40) 
-109.8554*  -104.986     -131.7755*  -133.5364*      ROA 
  (-1.69)  (-1.60)    (-1.83)  (-1.84)     
ROE     -33.5804*  -32.0774*      -39.1134**  -39.5573** 
    (-1.86)  (-1.75)     (-2.01)  (-2.04)   
MATURITY  -0.2315**  -0.2404** -0.2299** -0.2388** -0.2392**  -.2475** -0.2396**  -.24770*** 
  (-2.28)  (-2.36) (-2.29) (-2.37) (-2.33) (-2.39)  (-2.37)  (-2.43) 
WORK  0.1345  0.7596 0.5868 1.1547 0.6910 1.3257  1.3266  1.9519 
  (0.02)  (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.10) (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.27) 
REPAY  -9.7094  -7.961 -10.7694  -9.0784 -8.3502 -6.6890  -9.1003  -7.4826 
  (-1.33)  (-0.99) (-1.48) (-1.13) (-1.20) (-0.89)  (-1.31)  (-1.00) 
-3.3218  -3.5567  -3.0210 -3.3131 -3.0000 -3.1901  -2.5654  -2.7435  FACSIZE 
  (-1.14)  (-1.26) (-1.10) (-1.23) (-1.02) (-1.13)  (-0.93)  (-1.02) 
215.0213***  225.7252***  199.8202*** 208.8591*** 225.0933*** 230.4504***  215.5134*** 220.7251*** Constant 
  (2.90)  (2.69   )
Yes 
(2.88   )
Yes 
(2.68   )
Yes 
(3.91   )
Yes 
(3.67   )
Yes 
(3.98   )
Yes 
(3.75   )
Yes  Year Dummy  Yes 
72  72  72 72 72 72  72  72  N 
R²  0.3529  0.3466 0.3644 0.3572 0.3659 0.3618  0.3803  0.3764 
 This table reports the effects of agency conflicts, financial distress, proprietary information, and proprietary information on the holding share of 
agent banks.  ASSETS is the natural logarithm of the book value of borrower’s assets. SALES is the natural logarithm of the borrower’s annual sales. 
FATA is the borrower’s fixed assets to its book value of assets. LTDRATIO is The ratio of the borrower’s long-term debt to total debt. 
TOTALDEBT is the ratio of the borrower’s total debt to total assets. DEBTEQUITY is the ratio of the borrower’s total debt to total equity. ZSCORE 
is Altman’s z-score. R&D is the ratio of the borrower’s R&D expenditures to sales. ROA is the borrower’s return on assets. ROE is the borrower’s 
return on equity. MATURITY is the length of loan maturity in months. WORK is a dummy variable equal to 1 if loan purpose is working capital and 
0 otherwise. REPAY is a dummy variable equal to 1 if loan purpose is debt repayment and 0 otherwise. FACSIZE is the natural logarithm of the size 
of the loan facility. Figures are OLS regression coefficient estimates, and t-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * respectively indicate 








     
Table 10 OLS Regression Results for Sub-sample of Non-Keiretsu Borrowers:  
Lead Agent Share  
 
Equation (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
% Held by Lead Agent  Dependent Variable 
ASSETS  4.2237  4.7875  3.8779  4.2606       
  (1.00)  (1.13)  (0.94)  (1.02)       
SALES          1.4983  1.5625 1.2253 1.2090 
          (0.41)  (0.44) (0.35) (0.35) 
FATA  8.0795  4.2131  5.7123  2.4195 11.5047 8.2137 8.6260 5.6574 
  (0.65)  (0.31) (0.47) (0.18) (0.95) (0.64)  (0.75)  (0.45) 
LTDRATIO  -15.6684 -10.8396 -12.659  -8.6191 -14.4126 -9.7294  -11.4663  -7.5524 
(-1.03)  (-0.72)  (-0.89)  (-0.60)  (-0.98)  (-0.68) (-0.83) (-0.55)   
TOTALDEBT  -53.3176***   -57.7112***  -49.9484***   -54.3901***  
  (-2.90)   (-3.21)  (-2.69)   (-3.00)   
  -3.7685***    -3.6296***    -3.4643***  -3.3324***  DEBTEQUITY 
    (-2.84)  (-2.72)  (-2.56)    (-2.47) 
-1.754927**  -0.9213  -1.4916**  -0.5987 -1.2955 -0.4918  -1.1206  -0.2708  ZSCORE 
  (-2.30)  (-1.47) (-2.37) (-1.15) (-1.12) (-0.45)  (-1.05)  (-0.26) 
R&D 607.5347  1024.719*  1091.396***  1438.958*** 531.5685  914.3736  1011.904**  1340.686***
(1.11)  (1.90)  (2.70)  (3.10)  (0.91)  (1.60) (2.33) (2.75)   
ROA 285.8311**  211.1936*      279.3716**  210.0992*     
 (2.23)  (1.81)      (2.11)  (1.72)     
ROE     103.5812***  75.6701**      103.0899*** 77.40174***
     (3.71)  (2.47)     (3.62)  (2.50) 
MATURITY  0.1210***  0.1541*** 0.14697*** 0.1693***  0.1282***  0.1598*** 0.1542*** 0.1752*** 
  (2.79)  (3.23) (3.40) (3.50) (2.97) (3.32)  (3.57)  (3.60) 
WORK  -12.2433**  -11.1911*  -13.5789***  -12.908** -13.0592** -12.2946*  -14.3717*** -14.003** 
  (-2.00)  (-1.69) (-2.47) (-2.05) (-2.09) (-1.81)  (-2.59)  (-2.19) 
REPAY  -9.9073  -7.2065  -10.579  -7.9854 -10.4051 -7.9954  -11.0752*  -8.7739 
  (-1.42)  (-0.97) (-1.60) (-1.10) (-1.47) (-1.06)  (-1.65)  (-1.19) 
FACSIZE 3.3939  1.7123  2.5178  1.1241  4.9811*  3.670746  4.0569  2.9454 
  (0.96)  (0.47) (0.75) (0.32) (1.63) (1.19)  (1.43)  (1.00) 
Constant  -39.4548  -58.2078 -24.9749 -46.4807 -18.6376 -32.2199 -4.4804 -21.4012 
(-0.73)  (-1.04   )
Yes 
(-0.48   )
Yes 
(-0.86   )
Yes 
(-0.33   )
Yes 
(-0.56   )
Yes 
(-0.08   )
Yes 
(-0.38   )
Yes 
 
Year Dummy  Yes 
67  67 67 67 67 67  67  67  N 
0.5136  0.5248 0.5477 0.5414 0.5050 0.5136 0.5401 0.5322  R² 
This table reports the effects of agency conflicts, financial distress, proprietary information, and proprietary information on the holding share of agent 
banks.  ASSETS is the natural logarithm of the book value of borrower’s assets. SALES is the natural logarithm of the borrower’s annual sales. 
FATA is the borrower’s fixed assets to its book value of assets. LTDRATIO is The ratio of the borrower’s long-term debt to total debt. 
TOTALDEBT is the ratio of the borrower’s total debt to total assets. DEBTEQUITY is the ratio of the borrower’s total debt to total equity. ZSCORE 
is Altman’s z-score. R&D is the ratio of the borrower’s R&D expenditures to sales. ROA is the borrower’s return on assets. ROE is the borrower’s 
return on equity. MATURITY is the length of loan maturity in months. WORK is a dummy variable equal to 1 if loan purpose is working capital and 
0 otherwise. REPAY is a dummy variable equal to 1 if loan purpose is debt repayment and 0 otherwise. FACSIZE is the natural logarithm of the size 
of the loan facility. Figures are OLS regression coefficient estimates, and t-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * respectively indicate 
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Footnotes 
 
                                                 
1 Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), July 14, 2004  
  
2 Barzel, Habib and Johnsen (2000) describe a syndicate as an “ad hoc firm.” 
3 One key reason it took several years to restructure many large international loans during the 1980s was 
the large number of banks in these syndicates. 
4 The arranger typically acts as “book runner” for the deal.  This role involves decisions on the number 
and identity of the institutions that will be invited to participate and the various “bracket amounts” that 
will be offered. Participants that commit to larger amounts normally receive higher fees and more 
prestigious titles.  The title “Manager” might be associated with a $20 million allocation, for example, 
and “Co-manager” with a $10 million piece of the loan.  Institutions taking the smallest pieces are called 
“participants.”  When relatively large bracket amounts are offered by the book-runner, the syndicate 
becomes more concentrated if multiple participants seek the largest pieces of the loan.  Once the 
designated offer period closes, the loan will be either over-or undersubscribed.
4  In the case of an 
oversubscribed loan, the borrower typically is given an option to increase the size of the facility.  If the 
borrower chooses not to exercise this option, the arranging institution will allocate smaller commitments 
to participants than those initially sought, typically with an effort to make equal allocations within each 
bracket.  The final allocations are strictly at the discretion of the arranger, however.
4  The degree of 
concentration in the final allocations depends not only on how the arranger sets the bracket amounts, but 
also on excess demand for pieces of the loan within each bracket.  In the case of an undersubscribed loan, 
the arranger will take the residual amount, unless the original deal involved a “best efforts” arrangement.  
Alternatively, the borrower could agree to adjust the terms of the deal to make it more attractive to 
participants. 
5 The research by Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and Jones, Lang, and Nigro (2001) implicitly treats the 
arranger’s decision about the proportion of the loan it holds in its own portfolio as independent of the 






     
                                                                                                                                                             
prior to syndication, however.  Consequently, it is more realistic to view the arranger’s portion of the loan 
as dependent on the decisions of the other group members, although somewhat controllable since the 
arranger can close the syndication at its discretion.  An implication is that it is not appropriate to include 
the lead bank’s share in either the syndicate size or composition models since it is not an exogenous 
variable. 
6 Unfortunately, we cannot observe whether a loan is over- or undersubscribed in our data or the number 
of institutions invited to participate. 
7 Lee and Mullinaux (2004) used market to book ratio as a proxy for growth options, but we use  
 
FATA due to market data unavailability. Lee and Mullinaux (2004) showed mixed results on the  
 
market to book variable. 
 
8 The moral hazard problems between the borrower and lenders may be less severe in a syndicated loan 
setting compared to a loan participation. In a participation the loan buyer has no directly- enforceable 
rights against the borrower.  If the borrower defaults on loan payments, it is the loan seller that exercises 
control against the borrower, not the loan buyer.  Unless the loan seller actively takes actions to recover 
the loss, the buyer has to bear full risk of loss.  The buyer may have ability to re-sell the defaulted loan to 
the seller, which is called “recourse”.  Most loans are sold without recourse, since loan selling banks are 
required to reserve capital against loans sold with recourse.  By selling a loan without recourse, the seller 
can remove the loan from its balance sheet and thus has less incentive to monitor the borrower.   
In a syndicated loan, each lender has its own loan agreement with the borrower and thus has directly 
enforceable rights against the borrower.  In addition, the syndicate lenders have the right of setoff against 
the borrower’s deposits, which allows each syndicate member to withdraw the borrower’s deposits to pay 
for its unpaid interest and/or principal.  However, the borrower’s incentive to exploit lenders is not likely 
to be eliminated by the lender’s right of setoff and thus agency problems between the borrower and 






     
                                                                                                                                                             
9 One key reason it took several years to restructure many large international loans during the 1980s was 
the large number of banks in these syndicates. 
10   Denis (1990) investigates the use of a target firm’s defensive payout policy to maintain its 
independence in response to hostile corporate control activity.  Angbazo, Mei, and Saunders (1998) note 
that debt repayment and/or recapitalization typically are utilized for defensive purposes in corporate 
contests. 
13 Poisson regression assumes the data follow a Poisson distribution.  The primary characteristics of this 
distribution are skewness, non-negative values, and variance that increases with the mean.  Poisson 
regression is a special case of the Generalized Linear Model.   
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